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Twenty-two million families currently receive a total of $34 billion dollars in benefits from the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC).  In fact, the EITC is the largest cash transfer program for lower-income 
families at the federal level.  An unusual feature of the credit is its explicit goal to use the tax system to 
encourage and support those who choose to work. A large body of work has evaluated the labor supply 
effects the EITC and has generated several important findings regarding the behavioral response to taxes.  
Perhaps the main lesson learned from the evidence is the confirmation that real responses to taxes are 
important; labor supply does respond to the EITC.  The second major lesson is related to the nature of the 
labor supply response.  A consistent finding is that labor supply responses are concentrated along the 
extensive (entry) margin, rather than the intensive (hours worked) margin.  This distinction has 
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I.  Introduction and Overview 
The past two decades in the United States have witnessed an increasing reliance on the tax system as a 
means of providing cash assistance to lower-income families with children. A series of tax acts starting 
with the 1986 Tax Reform Act have increased assistance to the working poor through expansions of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), making it the largest federal cash-transfer program for lower-income 
families with children.  Over 20 million families are projected to have benefited from the tax credit in 
2003, at a total cost to the federal government of more than 34 billion dollars
1.  These transfers have been 
especially successful at reducing poverty in the United States.  In fact, Census data suggest that the 
federal credit now lifts more children out of poverty than any other government program.  "Some 4.9 
million people, including 2.7 million children, were removed from poverty in 2002 as a result of the 
federal EITC"(Llobrera and Zahradnik 2004).  These estimates are consistent with the fact that the 1993 
credit expansion was designed such that a full-time worker earning the minimum wage would not live in 
poverty.   
 
  This shift in the structure of public assistance is the outcome of a long-standing criticism that 
traditional welfare programs generate adverse incentives for work and family.  Advocates of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit have argued that the credit helps “promote both the values of family and work."  
Indeed, economic theory suggests that the EITC should be especially successful at promoting entry in to 
the labor force among eligible, single taxpayers. 
 
The recent expansions have offered researchers an excellent opportunity to evaluate the impacts 
of the EITC on behavior.  Hotz and Scholz’s (2003) review of the literature on the EITC shows that 
researchers have taken full advantage of this opportunity, examining outcomes such as work behavior, 
marriage, fertility, consumption expenditures and overall family well-being.  Here, we concentrate on the 
impacts of the EITC on labor supply, and in particular on the lessons learned about the labor supply 
responses to tax-transfer programs.   We argue that the evaluation of the EITC has been especially useful 
for the understanding the size and the composition of labor supply responses to tax incentives, and has 
informed the literature on the welfare evaluation of tax reforms as well as the optimal design of tax-
transfer schemes. 
 
In this review, we first provide a brief history of the EITC, along with a description of the current 
policies and recent tax expansions.  In Section III, we provide a descriptive analysis of the EITC 
population.  In particular, we use IRS data to examine the characteristics of EITC recipients including 
                                                 
1 By comparison, federal spending on Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), which block grants Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), stands at about 18.6 billion dollars (Hotz and Scholz 2003).   2  
number of children, filing status and income.   In Section IV, we use economic theory to discuss the 
expected impact of the EITC on labor supply.  In short, among eligible unmarried women with children, 
the EITC is expected to increase employment but reduce hours of work for those already in the labor 
market.  To target benefits to lower-income families, however, the EITC is based on family income, 
leading to a very different set of incentives for married taxpayers.  Among secondary earners in married 
couples, the EITC is expected to reduce labor force participation and hours worked for those already in 
the labor force 
 
  Section V summarizes what is known about the impacts of the EITC on labor supply.  The 
nature of the expected labor supply effects of the EITC lead us to structure our summary in the following 
manner.  First, we examine the impacts on single and married taxpayers separately, focusing exclusively 
on women.
2  Second, we examine separately the two different margins of labor supply responses—the 
extensive (employment) and intensive (hours worked by working individuals) margins.  The 
overwhelming finding of the empirical literature is that EITC has been especially successful at 
encouraging the employment of single parents, especially mothers.  There is little evidence, however, that 
the EITC has reduced the hours worked by those already in the labor force.  The empirical literature on 
married women is somewhat smaller but again consistent in its findings.  The studies show that the EITC 
leads to modest reductions in the employment and hours worked of married women. 
 
In Section VI, we discuss the possible explanations for the empirical finding that the EITC 
affects the extensive but not the intensive margin.  We also discuss the general equilibrium implications of 
the EITC—in particular whether the EITC affects gross wages.  Finally, we discuss the implications of this 
work for the optimal design of the EITC.  Recent work has emphasized the role of the extensive margin in 
the design of the tax-transfer schemes (Saez 2002) and the welfare evaluation of tax reform (Eissa, Kleven 
and Kreiner 2005).   We first review this work and then discuss whether there are potential efficiency 
gains associated with modifying the EITC.  Section VII presents our conclusions. 
 
 
II.   Operation and Brief History of the EITC 
The Earned Income Tax Credit began in 1975 as a modest program aimed at offsetting the social security 
payroll tax for low-income families with children.  It was the outcome of a vigorous policy debate 
surrounding the efficacy of a Negative Income Tax (NIT) as a means of reducing poverty.  The concern 
was that the NIT-which guarantees a minimum standard of living to everyone-would discourage labor 
                                                 
2 Our analysis of married couples focuses on married women because they have been found to be considerably more 
responsive to changes in wages and income than married men.     3  
market activity as it is gradually phased out.   Ultimately the EITC was born out of a desire to reward 
work. 
 
  The EITC is refundable so that a taxpayer with no federal tax liability, for example, would 
receive a tax refund from the government for the full amount of the credit.  Taxpayers may also receive 
the credit throughout the year with their paychecks; but in 2000, less than 5 percent of EITC recipients 
availed themselves of this early payment option (Friedman 2000).   A taxpayer’s eligibility for the earned 
income tax credit depends on the taxpayer’s earned income (or in some cases adjusted gross income), and 
the number of qualifying children who meet certain age, relationship and residency tests.  First, the 
taxpayer must have positive earned income, defined as wage and salary income, business self-employment 
income, and farm self-employment income.  Also, the taxpayer must have adjusted gross income and 
earned income below a specified amount (in 2004, the maximum allowable income for a taxpayer with 
two or more children is $34,458).  Second, a taxpayer must have a qualifying child, who must be under 
age 19 (or 24 if a full-time student) or permanently disabled and residing with the taxpayer for more than 
half the year.




  The amount of the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on the taxpayer’s earned 
income, adjusted gross income, and, since 1991, the number of EITC-eligible children in the household.  
There are three regions in the credit schedule.  The initial phase-in region transfers an amount equal to 
the subsidy rate times their earnings.  In tax year 2004, the subsidy rate of the EITC is 34 percent for 
taxpayers with one child and 40 percent for taxpayers with two or more children.  In the flat region, the 
family receives the maximum credit ($2604 and $4300, respectively), while in the phase-out region, the 
credit is phased out at the phase-out rate (16 and 21 percent). 
 
  Table I summarizes the parameters of the EITC over the history of the program.   The program 
grew slowly from its introduction in 1975 until 1986, and in fact shrank in real terms due to inflation.  
The 1987 expansion of the EITC, passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), increased the 
generosity of the credit for the lowest-income workers and extended its benefits beyond the poorest (see 
Eissa and Liebman 1996)
5.  By 1988, taxpayers with incomes between $11,000 and $18,576 became 
eligible for the credit and faced its phase-out marginal tax rate for the first time.  The 1987 EITC 
                                                 
3 Beginning in 1994, a small credit is available to low-income workers without children. 
4 See Eissa and Liebman (1996) for a more extensive discussion of EITC rules. 
5 TRA86 returned the real maximum credit to its 1975 level, and indexed the EITC for inflation.   4  
expansion interacted with other tax changes implemented after TRA86-including greater personal 
exemption and standard deduction-to help eliminate taxes on poor families.  The largest single expansion 
over this period was contained in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) legislation.  The 
1993 expansion of the EITC, phased in between 1994 and 1996,  led to an increase in the subsidy rate 
from 19.5 percent to 40 percent (18.5 to 34 percent) and an increase in the maximum credit from $1,511 
to $3,556 ($1,434 to $2,152) for taxpayers with two or more children (taxpayers with one child).  This 
expansion was substantially larger for those with two or more children. The phase-out rate was also raised, 
from 14 percent to 21 percent (13 to 16 percent) for taxpayers with two or more children (taxpayers with 
one child).  Overall, the range of the phase-out was expanded dramatically, such that by 1996 a filing unit 
with two children would still be eligible with income levels of almost $30,000.  Figure I illustrates the 
nominal value of the credit from 1984 to 2003, and highlights the dramatic expansion of the credit over 
time, as well as its effects on the families of different sizes. 
  
  These expansions have led to a dramatic and recent increase in the total cost of the EITC.  
Figure II shows the total cost (in real 2003 dollars) of the EITC from 1974-2003.  The figure clearly shows 
the rising expenditures associated with the 1986, 1990, and 1993 tax acts.  Importantly, between 1990 
and 1996 the program more than doubled in real terms.  
 
The popularity and perceived success of the EITC can also be seen in the increasing number of 
states that offer state credits.   As of 2004, a total of eighteen states have introduced state EITC’s that 
supplement the federal credit.
6  Almost all states structure their credits as a share of the federal credit, 
varying between 5 percent (Illinois) to more than 40 percent (Minnesota and Wisconsin) and almost all 
make the credit refundable like the federal credit.  Table II presents the characteristics of state EITC’s 
along with the date of their introduction.  It is notable that several states either introduced or expanded 
credits since the economic downturn starting in 2000, including Virginia, Indiana, Illinois and Kansas.  
This continuing growth of state EITCs has been attributed to a recognition among state policymakers that 
“state EITC’s can help working families stay afloat” in difficult labor markets (Llobrera and Zahradnik 
2004).  The extent to which this is true will depend on the EITC’s incidence, however. 
 
An important observation about the EITC is that the credit is based on annual earnings.  As a 
result, its relationship to a worker’s hourly wage is indirect.  Figure III shows exposure to the credit at 
different annual hours worked and hourly wages.  Among full-time workers, those earning the minimum 
wage receive the maximum credit, while those earning $15 per hour would be just ineligible.  Moreover 
                                                 
6 Legislation adopting a state EITC in Virginia was passed in 2004, but will not take effect until January 2006.  In 
addition local governments in Montgomery County, MD, and Denver, CO, offer their own version of EITC’s.   5  
the greater generosity of the program for two-child families implies that slightly higher-wage families will 
be eligible for the credit.   This indirect relationship has implications for the interpretation of the 
empirical evidence.  We return to this issue in the discussion section VI. 
 
III. The EITC Population 
IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) reports can be used to provide a profile of the EITC recipient population.  
Here we present tabulations of the 2001 Statistics of Income Public Use Tax File, which is a nationally 
representative sample of all individual tax returns filed in tax year 2001.  The file consists of a total of 
143,221 records (Internal Revenue Service 2004).  We use the tax file data to present tabulations of EITC 
recipients and costs by filing status, number of children, and earned income.   
 
In 2001, there were a total of 20 million EITC recipients costing a total of 33.3 billion dollars.  In 
Table III, we present tabulations of these recipients and claims by number of children and filing status.  
The results show that the number of EITC returns is about evenly split between those with one child 
versus two or more children.  Owing to the more generous credit for larger families, however, filers with 
two or more children receive 61 percent of total EITC dollars (refunds and tax expenditures) while those 
with one child receive 37 percent of expenditures (the remaining 2 percent funds the small credit for 
childless filers).   The first panel of Table III also shows that single and head of household filers represent 
fully three-quarters of EITC returns and expenditures while married couples filing jointly make up the 
remaining quarter.  This disproportionate share of unmarried filers among the EITC population reflects 
the higher eligibility rates—due to lower earnings and income—of single women with children.  The third 
panel of Table III presents the average EITC credit amount by filing status and number of children.  The 
average credit amount rises sharply with number of children--$2,459 for those with two or more children 
compared to $1,578 for those with one child--reflecting the more generous schedule for families with two 
or more children.    In addition, average EITC claims for single parents exceed average payments to 
married couples filing jointly.  As above, this reflects the higher incomes of married couples.     
 
Table IV presents the percent distribution of returns and expenditures for tax filers with children 
by EITC bracket, using 2001 SOI data.   This distribution is the critical determinant of the net labor 
supply effect of the EITC and its expansion (see discussion in the next section). The table shows that 
about one quarter of EITC head of household returns and expenditures go to filers in the subsidy (phase-
in) region of the credit.  Far fewer married couples (about 15%) have income that place them that region 
of the credit, however.    It is useful to separate single and married because the design of the EITC can 
generate very different labor supply incentives for these two populations.  In general, most EITC tax 
returns are located in the phase-out region of the credit.  This is especially true for married couples where   6  
about half of head of household and more than two-thirds of married couples are in the phase-out region.  
EITC expenditures show broadly the same pattern, though the distribution is slightly more evenly spread 
across the regions.  About one quarter of EITC benefits for head of household filers go to those in the 
subsidy region, while about 40-50 percent of benefits go to those in the phase-out region.  Among married 
couples, the data show only 15 percent of dollars benefit those with the lowest-income, while more than 
half of the dollars go those in the phase-out region. 
 
The SOI reports include a very limited set of observable characteristics of EITC recipients.  We 
expand our discussion by presenting a picture of the EITC population using survey data, which represents 
the data used in essentially all evaluations of the labor supply effects of the credit.  In particular, we 
provide demographic characteristics of single mothers—who represent the largest group of EITC 
recipients.  Eissa, Kleven and Kreiner [EKK] (2004) provide summary statistics for a sample of single 
mothers ages 18-49 from the 1986, 1991, 1994 and 2001 March Current Population (CPS) Surveys, 
covering income and earnings data for the prior calendar year-1985, 1990, 1993, and 2000.   The results 
(presented in Table V) show that the typical single mother during this period is in her early thirties, with a 
high school diploma, and fewer than two children.  In 2000, fully 83 percent of single mothers between 
the ages of 18-49 in the CPS are working, on average, 1426 hours per year at $11.24 per hour.   The data 
also show that the demographic characteristics of the typical eligible single mother have changed little 
over the period that the EITC has been expanded.  Between 1985 and 2000, the typical single mother is 
aging somewhat over the 15-year period - by just under a year and a half- with fewer children, and more 
education.  The most striking change for single mothers during this period is clearly the increase in labor 
supply, observed along both the margin of participation and hours worked.  
 
IV. Expected Effects of the EITC 
In this section, we examine the impact of the credit on labor supply discussing the expected impacts on 
the extensive (employment) and intensive (hours worked by working individuals) margins.
7  The 
participation and hours incentives are modeled assuming that taxpayers face no labor market restrictions 
in their choice of hours, given the (fixed) offered wage.
8  For simplicity, we consider first the case of an 
unmarried taxpayer and then extend the analysis to examine labor supply incentives for married couples.  
 
A. Unmarried Taxpayers 
                                                 
7 Another dimension of labor supply which we do not discuss here is human capital accumulation. This is examined 
in Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (2002) and reviewed in Hotz and Scholz (2003). 
 
8 We discuss later the potential impact of the EITC on wages earned by less-skilled workers. 
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Because the EITC is available only to taxpayers with earned income, standard labor supply theory predicts 
that the EITC will encourage labor force participation among single parents. The stylized budget 
constraint, in Figure IV, shows this impact graphically.  
 
The figure plots hours worked (horizontal axis) against income (vertical axis), ignoring for 
simplicity all other features of the tax-transfer system that affect single parents.
9  In the absence of the 
EITC, the taxpayer earns a gross wage w for each hour worked—hence the no-EITC budget constraint is 
given by segment AD, with slope w.  The EITC alters the budget constraint to ABCD.  In the phase-in 
region (AB), the EITC acts as a pure wage subsidy and increases the net wage from w to w(1+τs) where τs 
is the subsidy rate (40 percent for taxpayers with two or more children and 34 percent for taxpayers with 
one child in 2004).  In the flat region of the credit (BC), the taxpayer’s budget constraint is shifted out an 
amount equal to the maximum credit ($2604 for taxpayers with one child and $4300 for taxpayers with 
two or more children in 2004) and her gross (and net of tax) hourly wage is w.  Each dollar earned in the 
phaseout region of the EITC (CD) reduces the credit by a phaseout rate of τp (about 21 percent).  The net 
wage earned by the taxpayer in this region, w(1-τp), may be reduced even further once the taxpayer starts 
paying federal tax.   This figure is drawn to reflect the fact that phase-out region of the credit is much 
larger than the phase-in region.  For example, for a single women with two children in 2004 the phase-in 
region spans about 10 thousand dollars (from $0 to $10,750) while the phase-out region spans about 20 
thousand dollars (from $14,040 to $34,458).  
 
  The figure shows that the well-being of a taxpayer who is not working is not affected by the 
EITC.  Any taxpayer who preferred working before will still prefer working, and some taxpayers may find 
that the additional after-tax income from the EITC makes it worth entering the labor force.  Therefore, 
the impact of introducing or expanding the EITC on the labor force participation of unmarried taxpayers 
is unambiguously positive. 
 
The impact of the EITC on the hours worked by a single working taxpayer, however, depends on 
which region of the credit the woman is in before the credit is expanded or introduced.  If she is in the 
phase-in region, the EITC leads to an ambiguous impact on hours worked due to the negative income 
effect and positive substitution effect.  In the flat region, however, the EITC produces a negative income 
effect leading to an unambiguous reduction in hours worked.  In the phase-out region, the EITC produces 
a negative income and negative substitution effect leading again to an unambiguous reduction in hours 
worked.  Moreover, the phase-out of the credit alters the budget set in such a way that some taxpayers 
                                                 
9 An important omission here are means tested transfers such as AFDC/TANF and food stamps.  These programs 
have large implicit tax rates and create large disincentives to enter and increase work (Moffitt 1992).  Ignoring 
transfer programs do not affect the qualitative conclusions in this section.   8  
with incomes beyond the phase-out region may choose to reduce their hours of work and take advantage 
of the credit.  Recalling from Table IV above that about three-quarters of single EITC recipients have 
earnings in the flat and phase-out region of the credit—thus the expectation is that the EITC will reduce 
the number of hours worked by most eligible single taxpayers already in the labor force. 
 
To illustrate how the EITC affects the incentives faced by single taxpayers, Table VI presents 
average tax rates faced by hypothetical single taxpayers earning different wage rates, with different family 
sizes.  These calculations are based on the NBER TAXSIM model and cover all federal income taxes and 
payroll taxes under 2004 law.
10 We calculate average tax rates for three cases: (1) moving from no work to 
part time work (20 hours per week, 52 weeks per year); (2) moving from no work to full time work (40 
hours per week, 52 weeks per year); and moving from part time to full time work.  The average tax rates 
are calculated with the EITC (columns 1-3) and without the EITC (columns 4-6).  The tax rates are 
calculated for women with one child and two or more children to reflect the different EITC schedules and 
for women over a range of wage rates from the federal minimum ($5.15) to $15 per hour.  
 
These calculations show that the EITC reduces average tax rates of entering (part and full time) 
work across all family sizes and all wage levels, thereby illustrating the prediction that participation should 
unambiguously increase for single parents.  The impact of the EITC on these tax rates for entering work 
can be sizable, even for higher wage women. For example, in tax year 2004 a woman earning $10 per hour 
with two children faces a -25 percent average tax rate (subsidy) for entering work at part time levels and a 
-3 percent average tax rate (subsidy) for entering work at full time levels.  In the absence of an EITC, the 
same woman would face average tax rates of 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively.  The results show 
that the impacts of the EITC are greatest for lower wage women (with more earnings in the phase-in 
region), for part time entrants, and for women with two or more children. 
 
The table also illustrates how the EITC penalizes increasing work for those already in the work 
force.  If this woman with two children earning $10 per hour were to increase work from part to full time, 
however, she faces an average tax rate of 18 percent with the EITC (due to the phase-out rate) compared 
to 10 percent without the EITC.  This work disincentive on the intensive (hours) margin exists for all but 
the lowest wage women (who even at full time work are not yet in the phase-out region of the credit). 
 
In addition to these tax rates for hypothetical taxpayers, Eissa, Kleven and Kreiner (2004) use 
their CPS sample of single mothers for 1985, 1990, 1993, and 2000 and calculate average and marginal 
                                                 
10 These calculations assume that the individual bears the burden of the entire FICA tax, with a combined marginal 
tax rate of 15.3 percent.  For these calculations, total taxes paid equal federal income tax plus the payroll tax less the 
(nonrefundable and refundable) child tax credit and the EITC.     9  
tax rates (using TAXSIM) at observed earnings.  The results are presented in the bottom of Table V- and 
Their results show that the average tax rates declined consistently over the period, from 14.5 percent in 
1985 to a negative 4.1 percent in 2000.  It is notable that the time series change in the marginal tax rate is 
more moderate and less systematic than that of the average tax rate.   Note that these tax rates will vary 
over time due to changes in tax policy (the EITC and all other income tax changes), and also with 
changes in the earnings and family size of their sample of single women.  
 
EKK also isolate the impact of the federal tax reforms (again EITC and non-EITC tax changes) 
on tax rates by imputing a post-reform tax rate at given pre-reform characteristics.  These results (labeled 
“Effect of tax act” in Table V) show that all tax acts since 1986 have reduced both the average and 
marginal tax rates faced by single taxpayers, and have generally reduced tax liability (average tax rates) 
more significantly than marginal tax rates.  The largest reduction in tax rates is due to OBRA93. 
 
B. Married Taxpayers 
In contrast to the predictions for single women, the EITC is expected to reduce the participation and 
hours worked of most eligible married women.  This occurs also because the credit is based on family 
earnings and income.  Suppose family labor supply follows a sequential model, with the husband as the 
primary earner and the wife as the secondary earner.  In this model, the effect of the credit on the labor 
supply of primary earners is the same as that of single taxpayers—incentives to participate in the labor 
market strengthen unambiguously while hours of work incentives are ambiguous, though likely negative 
given the distribution of taxpayer income along the EITC schedule. 
 
  The impact of the EITC on secondary earners is more complicated because it depends on the 
earnings of the primary earner.  Assume for simplicity that the husband is the primary earner, and further 
that his earnings place the family in the phase-out range
11. The family receives the credit if the wife 
remains out of the labor force, but the credit amount will decrease with each dollar earned if she enters 
the labor market.  In the phase-out range, therefore, the EITC unambiguously reduces hours worked and 
participation, by raising family income and reducing the net-of-tax wage.  If the husband’s earnings place 
the family in the flat region, the credit unambiguously lowers labor-market participation and hours 
worked by married women (through a pure income effect).  Of course, it is also possible for the wife’s work 
effort to increase the family’s credit if the husband’s earnings are in the subsidy region (up to $7,660 or 
$10,750 in 2004 depending on the number of children), but very few married couples are likely to have 
incomes in this range.  
                                                 
11 The figures in Eissa and Hoynes (2004) suggest that—measured by relative earnings—women are predominantly 
secondary earners. In a sample of couples with a high school education or less, about 90 percent of all wives, and 85 
percent of working wives, earn less than their husbands.  In this discussion and in the literature more broadly, women 
are assumed to be secondary earners.   10  
 
  The impact of the EITC on the labor supply of married couples therefore depends on the 
distribution of family income along the schedule, the distribution of earnings within the household and the 
relative elasticities of labor supply with respect to taxes.  Secondary earners whose spouses have earnings 
in the flat and phase-out regions should be less likely to work and should work fewer hours, while those 
whose spouses have income in the phase-in region should be more likely to work but can increase or 
reduce their hours worked.  Given the distribution of income, it is unlikely the EITC will have any 
positive effect on the labor supply of married women. 
 
  To illustrate the work incentives for married women, Table VII presents average tax rates (using 
TAXSIM) similar to those presented above for single women.  Again the table presents average tax rates 
for entering and increasing work including and excluding the EITC, and for a range of wages and family 
sizes.  These calculations also require an assumption about the earnings of the husband.  We assume that 
the husband’s labor supply is fixed at full-time work and he earns the same hourly wage as his wife.  There 
are two striking observations from the table.  First, average tax rates are everywhere higher for married 
women with the EITC compared to without the EITC.  For example, a woman earning $10 per hour with 
two children who enters part time work faces a 36 percent average tax rate with the EITC and a 14 
percent tax rate without the EITC.  The work disincentive impacts of the EITC extend quite high into 
the wage distribution reflecting the high breakeven earnings point in the EITC ($31,338 for those with 
one child and $35,458 for those with two or more children in 2004).  Our assumption of full time work by 
the husband implies that our calculations do not show any positive participation incentives for women 
with very low earning husbands.  With employment rates for low educated married men approaching 95 
percent or higher, however, this is likely to be a small group of women (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004) 
 
Second, married women with children face much higher marginal tax rates compared to single 
women with children.  This occurs in part because the federal tax schedule is progressive, though 
calculations (in Tables VI-VII) show that the EITC plays an important role.  The role of increasing 
marginal tax rates has been discussed in the taxes and labor supply literature more broadly (e.g., Eissa 
1995), but there is less discussion of the EITC in this setting. 
 
 
V. What Have we Learned about Labor Supply and the EITC? 
A large body of work has examined both the distributional impacts and the behavioral responses to the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, including labor supply, family formation and consumption.  Perhaps because 
of its explicit goal of encouraging work, the bulk of this evidence has been on labor supply.   Our goal in 
this discussion is to summarize the major findings in the literature and to discuss their implications for the   11  
design of tax-transfer programs.  Readers interested a more exhaustive summary should see the 
comprehensive review by Hotz and Scholz (2003). 
 
To presage the main findings, there is overwhelming evidence the EITC encourages work among 
single mothers but little evidence that eligible-working women adjust their hours of work in response to 
the EITC.  Perhaps most striking about these findings is their consistency across different empirical 
methods - including both quasi-experimental methods (Eissa and Liebman 1996, Eissa and Hoynes 2004, 
Hotz, Mullin and Scholz 2002) and more structural methods (Dickert, Houser and Scholz 1995 and 
Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001)- as well as different EITC expansions. 
 
To interpret and compare the empirical results, we first clarify the different sources of identifying 
variation.  While all individuals face the same tax schedule at any point in time, they face different tax 
rates based on their filing (i.e. family) status, family size (number of children), non-labor income and 
earned income (wages and hours worked).  Additionally, tax schedules and, therefore, rates vary over 
time with policy reforms.  The main difference between the quasi-experimental approach and more 
structural methods is the use of group versus individual-level variation in taxes.  The first approach 
assumes that all relevant wage and income changes are captured by group level variation in family type 
and size (presence and number of children) and time.  The EITC effect is the change in employment 
(relative to that of childless women) of women with children after the EITC expansion.  To the extent 
that tax rates, wages and incomes are measured with error, this grouping approach reduces any 
measurement error bias in the coefficients of interest. 
 
  Most studies take advantage of the large federal expansions in the credit in 1986, 1990, and 1993 
that affected incentives for single and married women with children.  To control for other factors that 
may be contemporaneous with the policy changes, many studies utilize control groups and estimate 
difference-in-difference models.  The EITC design and expansions suggest a number of possible 
strategies—such as comparing women with different family sizes (presence and number of children), 
marital status, earnings or education levels—for identifying labor supply responses.  These models seem to 
work well and provide robust estimates for the impact of the EITC on participation, but may be less well 
suited for estimating the impacts on hours worked.  Analyzing the determinants of hours worked is more 
complicated due to the changes in the composition of the working sample and the endogeneity of work 
more generally.  We return to this final point in discussion section VI.  First, however, we review the 
empirical evidence on different margins of labor supply and for different groups. 
 
A.  The EITC and the Labor Supply of Single Taxpayers 
   12  
Labor Force Participation 
The discussion of labor supply above shows that the EITC is expected to increase the participation of 
single women with children and reduce the hours worked for the majority of those already in the labor 
force.  Several papers have estimated the impact of the EITC on employment decisions of single women 
(Dickert, Hauser and Scholz 1995; Eissa and Liebman 1996; Ellwood 2000; Grogger 2003; Hotz et al 
2002; Keane and Moffitt 1998; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001; Rothstein 2005), all consistently 
finding that the EITC increased their labor force participation. 
 
Several papers estimate difference-in-difference models applied to a single or multiple expansions 
of the EITC.  In these models, changes in the employment rate of the treatment or eligible group (single 
women with children) is compared to the change in the employment rate of a control or unaffected group.  
This approach is used by Eissa and Liebman (EL, 1996), Ellwood (2000), Hotz et al (2002), Meyer and 
Rosenbaum (MR, 2000), and Rothstein (2005).  The most common control group is childless single 
women (EL 1996, MR 2000, Rothstein 2005).  Other comparisons exploit different features of the design 
of the EITC.  Ellwood (2000) and Rothstein (2005) use the fact that the shape of the credit implies 
different incentives at different hourly wages and compare single mothers at different wage or skill levels. 
EL (1996), Hotz et al (2002), and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) exploit the second child marginal credit 
and compare single women with one versus those with two or more children.   
 
  To illustrate the findings from the difference-in-difference literature, Figure V presents annual 
employment rates for women over the period 1984-2003.  We show the employment rates for four groups: 
single women with children, single women without children, married women with children, and married 
women without children.   We use the March CPS for these calculations where employment is defined by 
any work over the calendar year.
12  The figure shows the dramatic increase in employment rates for single 
women with children compared to single women without children.  For example, between 1984 and 2003 
employment rates of single mothers increased by 12 percentage points—from 73 percent in 1984 to 85 
percent in 2003.  Most of this change occurred between 1992 and 1999 where employment rates 
increased by 16 percentage points.  This is during the period of the largest expansion in the EITC due to 
OBRA 1993.  Over this same period, there was little change in employment rates of single women 
without children. 
 
Several authors (Ellwood 2000, Rothstein 2005, Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000) find that the 
group with the most to gain from EITC expansions (e.g, women with lower wages, lower education levels, 
                                                 
12 We limit the analysis to women ages 19-44, who are not in school or disabled. We also exclude women with 
positive earnings but zero hours and women with positive hours and zero earnings. Single women are divorced, 
separated, widowed, or never married and married women include those with spouse present.  The results are based 
on the CPS survey years 1985-2004.   13  
more children, and single women) experienced larger gains in employment rates.  To illustrate these 
findings, the next two figures reproduce results from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) and Rothstein (2005).  
Figure VI reproduces Meyer and Rosenbaum’s (2000) difference-in-difference estimates of employment 
rates for three comparisons—single mothers and single women without children, single mothers and black 
men, and single mothers and married mothers—where the difference is normalized to 0 in 1984
13.  The 
figure shows that single mothers’ employment increased relative to each of these control groups and the 
gains are well timed to the expansions of the EITC in 1986, 1990 and 1993.   Figure VII, reproduced from 
Rothstein (2005), extends the single mother versus childless single women comparison and estimates 
difference-in-difference models of the 1993 expansion by wage level.  The figure shows that employment 
increased with OBRA93 for all single mothers relative to childless women and, as expected, the impacts 
decrease with the woman’s wage. 
 
  Another approach recognizes that tax-transfer policy has non-neutral effects within groups and 
used individual variation in net wages and net non-labor income.  Consequently, identification is based on 
cross-sectional and time variation in the EITC and federal taxes.  For example, Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2001) use instead state-time variation in labor supply incentives and measure the gains to work from 
wages, net of federal and state taxes, and transfer benefits (AFDC/TANF, Food stamps and Medicaid).
14   
 
  Overall these studies suggest a strong positive relationship between the EITC and employment 
rates of single women with children.  Further, the results are remarkably consistent across different policy 
expansions, different control groups and different methodologies.  The estimated size of the labor supply 
effect differs depending on the particular expansion considered.  Eissa and Liebman (1996) find that the 
1986 expansion of the EITC led to a 2.8 percentage point increase in participation (out of a base of 74.2) 
for single mothers.  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) find that 60 percent of the 8.7 percentage point 
increase in annual employment single mothers between 1984 and 1996 is due to the EITC.  They find 
that a smaller amount, 35 percent of the increase in participation between 1992 and 1996 is due to the 
EITC (with the remainder due to welfare reform and other changes).  The range of the implied labor force 
participation elasticity with respect to net income across all studies is quite narrow—between 0.69 and 
1.16 (Hotz and Scholz 2003).
15 
                                                 
13 Meyer and Rosenbaum’s (2000) estimates are based on a sample from the March CPS for 1984-1996. The estimates 
are from a probit model that includes controls for demographic variables, residential location, unearned income, state 
unemployment rate (and its interactions with single mother and education level), state and year fixed effects.   
 
14 Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) also control for welfare reform variables and state spending on educational training, 
job search assistance, and child care assistance for AFDC recipients.  The gains to work are obtained by integrating 
over the empirical distribution of wages and hours worked for working women and calculating net income at each 
wage-hours possibility. 
15 This range excludes the estimates from Hotz et al (2002). Their studies differ from the others in that their sample is 
limited to welfare recipients (or prior recipients).    14  
   
Hours Worked 
The EITC is expected to unambiguously reduce hours worked by the vast majority of eligible workers.  In 
sharp contrast to the findings above, however, there is little evidence consistent with this prediction. 
 
A limited set of papers have examined the impact of the EITC on the hours worked by single 
mothers.  This is in part because estimating the hours worked response of workers to the EITC budget 
constraint is fundamentally a harder empirical problem.  In particular, one has to deal with the selection 
of individuals into the labor force. Eissa and Liebman (1996) apply their difference-in-difference model to 
annual hours worked (conditional on working) and find a small positive (and marginally significant) 
impact on all single mothers and a zero impact on low educated single mothers.  Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(1999) find mixed (positive and negative) but insignificant impacts of the EITC on hours worked 
(conditional on working).  Rothstein (2005) finds no difference between single mothers and childless 
single women in weekly hours worked (conditional on working) across the wage distribution.  Keane and 
Moffitt (1998) estimate a structural model of labor supply choice and simulate the effect of the EITC on 
total hours but do not present a separate estimate for those already working.  
 
To illustrate the findings from the literature, Figure VIII presents average hours worked 
(conditional on working) for working single women with and without children over 1984-2003 using our  
CPS sample described above.  Consistent with the studies surveyed, the figure provides no evidence that 
hours of work decreased for single mothers relative to single women without children as the EITC 
expanded.   Figure IX refines this analysis by focusing in on the phase-out region of the credit where the 
marginal tax rates are highest.  Specifically, the figure plots average earnings for single women with 
earnings within $1000 of the 1996 phase-out region of the credit.  Consider a single woman with two 
children who, in 1984, earned $15,000 per year.  At that time, she was above the EITC breakeven 
earnings point.  After the 1986 expansions, the same woman (at the same real earnings level) faced a 10 
percent EITC phase-out rate.  After the 1990 EITC expansions the phase-out rate she faced is about 14 
percent and finally after the 1993 expansions the phase-out is up to about 21 percent. Single mothers with 
earnings in this range (which we adjusted for change in prices each year) are in the range where the tax 
rates have increased the most.  Strikingly, this figure shows no pattern of a reduction in hours worked for 
single women with children relative to single women without children. 
 
Another source of evidence builds on the prediction from labor supply theory that taxpayers 
should be bunched at the kinks in the EITC schedule (and should be less present at the end of the EITC 
schedule). Liebman (1998) and Saez (2002) use tax return data and find no evidence of consistent with   15  
these predictions.  At the end of this section we return to these results and discuss why the literature finds 
a participation effect but no hours worked effect.  
 
B.  The EITC and Labor Supply of Married Taxpayers 
While the literature on married women and the EITC is limited, the results are quite consistent with the 
theoretical expectations.  Eissa and Hoynes (2004) estimate a difference-in-difference model comparing 
married mothers to married women without children and find that the 1993 EITC expansion led to a one 
percentage point reduction in the participation rate of married mothers.  These results are illustrated in 
Figure X, reproduced from Eissa and Hoynes (2004), which presents estimates of the change (relative to 
1984) in average employment rates for married women with children compared to married women 
without children (controlling for demographics, macroeconomic cycles and state and year fixed effects).  
For comparison, the figure also shows the change (relative to 1984) in the average EITC for their sample.  
This shows that employment by married mothers declined relative to that of childless married women 
following the 1990 and 1993 expansions (though not the 1986 expansion).   This finding is consistent 
with Ellwood (2000) who compares married mothers in high and low wage quartiles and finds that 
expansions of the EITC are associated with a reduction in labor market participation by married mothers. 
 
Eissa and Hoynes (2004) also estimate a reduced form employment model for married women (as 
secondary earners) where they parameterize the impact of the EITC and federal taxes on after-tax gains to 
entering work.  They find that the expansions in the EITC between 1984 and 1996 led to about a one 
percentage point reduction in the employment of married mothers.  These estimates are similar, but 
somewhat smaller than their difference-in-difference estimates.   
 
Eissa and Hoynes (forthcoming) find that expansions in the EITC are also associated with 
reductions in hours worked for married women who are working.  They estimate hours of work as a 
function of after tax wages and unearned income, again assuming women are secondary earners.  They 
instrument for the after tax wage using tax parameters.  They find that expansions in the EITC from 
1984-1996 led to a small, 1 to 4 percent, decrease in annual hours for married women with children.  
Heim (2005) estimates a structural model of family labor supply and finds similar impacts on hours worked 




A.  Why Do We Observe a Participation Effect but no Hours Effect? 
A consistent and somewhat puzzling finding in the empirical literature on the EITC and labor supply is 
the large response of the participation decision and the lack of any response by the reported hours worked   16  
by taxpayers in the labor force.   Here we focus on single mothers who, as noted above, represent over 
three-quarters of EITC recipients.  
 
The puzzle is why no impact on hours worked is found in any evaluation of the EITC.  Theory 
suggests that we should observe a decline in the hours worked by all taxpayers beyond the phase-in of the 
credit.  While the income effect operates to reduce hours worked in the flat region, both income and 
substitution effects operate to reduce hours worked in the phase-out region of the credit.   
 
We review several explanations that have been offered.   The first explanation is based on a 
standard finding in the empirical labor supply literature, which is that the labor supply elasticity falls when 
estimated using a sample of working (rather than all) women (Mroz 1987, Triest 1990).   The implication 
of this finding is that the participation (extensive) margin is more responsive than the hours (intensive) 
margin.  It may well be that the hours worked elasticity is too small to be estimated precisely using quasi-
experimental approaches.  If, for example, the elasticity of hours worked by single women with children is 
0.3, then the 1993 EITC expansion would reduce hours of work by 8 percent.
16  It is not unreasonable to 
consider this reduction as too small to be identified empirically, especially given the somewhat crude 
comparison-of-means approach typically used.  If this is correct, then the next question is—why is the 
elasticity on the intensive margin consistently lower than the extensive margin? 
 
One reason why there may be no effect of the EITC on hours-worked is that workers are unable 
to choose continuous hours of work. This would occur if, for example, workers are bound by institutional 
restrictions or by norms for part time and full time work.
17   To examine the validity of this explanation, 
Figure XI presents the distribution of annual hours worked for our CPS sample of single mothers in 1986, 
1990, 1993, and 2000.  (Note this includes all single mothers and, in particular, is not limited to those 
with earnings in the EITC eligible range.) Two observations are worth noting.  First, annual hours are 
highly concentrated at full-time work.  While some single mothers work part-time (primarily part-year), 
the majority of single mothers work full-time (full year).  Second, the increase in employment mirrors the 
increase in full-time, full-year work.  One (testable) interpretation of this trend is that new workers enter 
the labor market at full-time work—consistent with a labor supply model with large fixed costs of work.    
 
Another reason why no hours-worked effect has been estimated is that reported hours in the 
survey data are measured with error (Bound and Krueger 1991, Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz 2001).  
                                                 
16 The 1993 expansion in the EITC increased the phase-out rate to 21.06 (15.98) percent from 13.93 (13.21) percent 
for families with one child (two or more children).  Assuming the woman faces a 15 percent marginal tax rate and the 
full 15.30 percent FICA rate, this implies a 13 percent reduction in the net of tax wage. 
 
17 Alternatively, one can argue that a worker can change jobs as an additional way to change hours.   17  
Annual hours of work are typically constructed as the product of weeks worked last year times usual hours 
worked per week last year.  Other than standard recall error, individuals with varying weekly hours may 
make errors in averaging. 
 
  Finally, taxpayers may not be fully aware of the structure of the EITC schedule.  Almost all 
taxpayers receive the EITC as a lump sum payment with their annual tax return (Friedman 2000), and 
therefore have little opportunity to learn about the features of the credit.  This may be especially true for 
the phase-out region of the credit, in part because of the confounding effects of non-EITC federal income 
taxes.  This EITC structure and its delivery are in contrast to the monthly reporting period in welfare 
programs and to the weekly or biweekly paycheck and its opportunities for learning about FICA or 
ordinary income taxes.  Further, informal and formal surveys of EITC eligibles suggest that knowledge 
about the credit is relatively high, though by no means universal (Liebman 1998, Phillips 2001, Smeeding 
et al 2000, Romich and Weisner 2000).  Phillips, for example, finds that about 66 percent of families 
nationally had heard of the EITC.  There is scant evidence, however, that those likely eligible for the 
credit understand its structure or the different incentives implied.  
 
B.  Implications for Optimal Tax and Welfare  
The finding that labor force participation responses are more significant than hours worked responses has 
several important implications for the design of tax-transfer programs and the welfare evaluation of 
taxation.  Recent work has shown accounting for a labor force participation responses can change the 
optimal transfer program (Saez, 2002).   More precisely, this work has shown that with sufficiently high 
participation elasticities, the optimal tax-transfer scheme can be similar to the EITC - with negative 
marginal tax rates at the bottom of the earnings distribution.  An EITC would, on the other hand, be 
inefficient in a standard model with only intensive (hours worked) responses.
18   
 
Liebman (2002) extends on this work by examining more closely the optimal design of the EITC.   
He uses a micro-simulation model calibrated to 1999 CPS data to illustrate the trade-offs in the design of 
an EITC -including the optimal maximum credit, phase-in and phase-out rates- with fixed costs and 
participation effects.   Liebman finds that the efficiency cost of transferring income through the EITC is 
substantially lower than previous studies have found, in large part because of the participation response of 
single mothers and the associated reduced welfare spending.  His simulations suggest a cost of less than $2 
to provide a transfer worth $1 to EITC recipients.     
 
                                                 
18 Saez shows that the optimal program is instead a classical Negative Income Tax program, with a substantial income 
guarantee that is phased out a high rate.     18  
Eissa, Kleven and Kriener (2005) take a different approach and examine the impact of 
participation responses on the welfare evaluation of actual tax reforms.   They extend the standard 
framework for welfare evaluation of tax reforms to account for discrete labor market entry by way of non-
convexities in preferences and budget sets.  Such non-convexities are significant because they allow first-
order welfare effects along the extensive (participation) margin.   EKK simulate the effects of the 1986, 
1990, 1993 and 2001 tax acts in the United States and show that each had different effects on tax rates 
along the intensive and extensive margins.  The 1993 EITC expansion, for example, reduced the tax rates 
on labor force participation, but increased the marginal tax rates on hours worked for most workers.  The 
authors show that conflating these two tax rates in welfare analysis can be fundamentally misleading.  For 
tax reforms that change average tax rates differently than marginal tax rates (such as the 1993 expansion 
of the EITC), ignoring the participation margin can lead to even the wrong sign of the welfare effect. 
 
C.  Incidence 
Understanding the effects of the EITC on wages is directly relevant to evaluating the effectiveness of the 
EITC, and its longer run effects of labor supply.  If the EITC reduces gross wages below what they would 
have been otherwise, the credit may do little, if anything to encourage labor supply, and may operate to 
the primary benefit of low-wage employers.    
 
Recent work by Leigh (2004) and Rothstein (2005) directly examine the effect of the EITC on 
pre-tax wages, using very different methods.  Leigh uses variation across states in the presence and 
generosity of state EITC add-ons and finds a very strong negative effect of the credit on wages, implying 
very little benefit of the credit for its recipients.  One drawback to Leigh’s approach is that state EITC’s 
are small relative to the federal program, and many recipients may not be aware of their existence.  As a 
consequence behavioral responses may be muted, making it difficult to identify the incidence of the 
credit.  Rothstein uses variation from the 1993 federal credit expansion along the wage distribution and 
finds that low-skill women’s wages actually increased slightly even as their labor force participation 
increased.  These results imply an upward-sloping demand curve, though they are by no means sufficiently 
precise to reject a small downward slope.  One possible explanation for the conflicting findings of the 
Leigh and Rothstein studies is the different sources of identification.  Clearly more work needs to done to 
increase our understanding of the broader labor market effects of the EITC. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
An unusual feature of the credit is its explicit goal to use the tax system to encourage and support those 
who choose to work.  A large body of work has evaluated the labor supply effects the EITC and has 
generated several important findings regarding the behavioral response to taxes.  This paper reviews this 
empirical literature, focusing on two main lessons.  It argues that perhaps the main lesson learned from   19  
the evidence is the confirmation that real responses to taxes are important; labor supply does respond to 
the EITC.  The second major lesson is related to the nature of the labor supply response, namely that that 
the response is concentrated along the extensive (entry) margin, rather than the intensive (hours worked) 
margin. We discuss different explanations of this pattern of labor supply responses, and discuss its 
implications for the optimal design of tax-transfer programs and for the welfare evaluation of tax reforms.   
 
Empirical evidence suggests that transferring dollars to the needy using an EITC – rather than a 
Negative Income Tax – may be optimal.  This evidence cannot yet support more precise judgments about 
the optimal design of the EITC, however.  That would require – among other things – identifying the 
hours of work response of workers to the EITC.   20  
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Figure II 
Real Spending on the EITC (Billions of 2003 Dollars) 
 
 

































Source:  Eissa, Rothstein and Nichols (2005).   Figure shows the value of the EITC by wage level and 
annual hours worked assuming that there is one worker in the family and no other sources of income.  
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Figure IV 
Stylized Budget Constraint for the EITC 
 
 
After Tax and 
Transfer 
Income 







Slope = w 
Phase-in Region 
Slope = w(1+τs) 
Slope = w 
Phase-out Region 
Slope = w(1-τp)   27  
Figure V 
Annual Employment Rates for Women  
By Marital Status and Presence of Children, 1984-2003 
 
 
Notes:  Calculations based on the 1985-2004 March CPS and include women ages 19-44, not in school 
and not disabled.  It also excludes women with positive earnings but zero hours and those with positive 
hours and zero earnings.  Married women include those with spouse present and single women include 
divorced, widowed and never married women.  Figure shows the fraction of women who worked at all in 
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Figure VI 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Annual Employment Rates 
Single Mothers versus Control Groups, 1984-1996 
 
 
Note: Reproduced from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Figure 9.  Treatment group includes single women 
ages 19-44 from the March CPS for 1985-1997.  Each line represents the difference in employment rates 
between the treatment group (single mothers) and one of three control groups.  The estimates are from a 
probit model that controls for demographic variables, residential location, unearned income, state 
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Figure VII 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of OBRA93 on Annual Employment Rates, by Wage Level 
Single Mothers versus Single Women without Children 
 
 
Note: Reproduced from Rothstein (2005), Figure 10. Sample includes women ages 19-64 from the March 
CPS. The Pre-OBRA93 period is 1992-1993 and the post-OBRA93 period is 1996-1997.  Each line 
represents the difference in employment rates between the treatment group (single mothers with one or 
two or more children) and the control group (single women without children).  The estimates are from a 
semi-parametric model that controls for education, potential experience, race/ethnicity, number and 
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Figure VIII 
























Notes:  Calculations based on the 1985-2004 March CPS and include single women ages 19-44, not in 
school, not disabled, who worked at all during the calendar year.  It also excludes women with positive 
earnings but zero hours and those with positive hours and zero earnings.  Single women include divorced, 
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Figure IX 
Average Annual Hours Worked for Single Women in the Phase-out Region of the EITC, 1984-2003 
























Notes:  Calculations based on the 1985-2004 March CPS and include single women ages 19-44, not in 
school and not disabled.  It also excludes women with positive earnings but zero hours and those with 
positive hours and zero earnings.  Single women include divorced, widowed and never married women.  
The figure shows average annual hours worked for the sample of single women who have earnings within 
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Figure X 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Annual Employment Rates, 1984-1996 




Note: Reproduced from Eissa and Hoynes (2004), Figure 5.  Sample includes married women ages 25-54 
with less than a high school education from the March CPS for 1985-1997.  The sample excludes couples 
where one spouse was ill or disabled, in the military, or in school full time during the previous year. The 
line with square markets gives the change (relative to 1984) in average annual employment rates for 
married women with children compared to married women without children.  The estimates are from a 
probit model that controls for demographic variables, state dummies, state labor market variables, and 
year effects for both groups.  The line with a circle marker gives the change (relative to 1984) in the 
























































































































Notes:  Reproduced from Eissa, Kleven  and Kreiner (2004), using March CPS sample of single women 
with children, ages 19-44, not in school, and not disabled. It also excludes women with positive earnings 
but zero hours and those with positive hours and zero earnings.  Single women include divorced, widowed 
and never married women.  Figure provides a smoothed estimate of the distribution of annual hours 




FEDERAL INCOME TAX AND EITC PARAMETERS, 1984-2005 
 






















(family with one child; family two or more children) 
 
1984
   [0.000; 0.500]  $1,000 ; $0 0.100 $500 0.125  $10,000
1985
   [0.000; 0.500]  $1,040 ; $0 0.110 $550 0.122  $11,000
1986   [0.000;  0.500]  $1,080 ; $0 0.110 $550 0.122  $11,000
    
TRA86      
1987  [0.110; 0.390]  $1,900 ; $2,540 0.140 $851 0.100  $15,432
1988  [0.150; 0.330]  $1,950 ; $4,400 0.140 $874 0.100  $18,576
1989  [0.150; 0.330]  $2,000 ; $4,550 0.140 $910 0.100  $19,340
1990  [0.150; 0.330]  $2,050 ; $4,750 0.140 $953 0.100  $20,264
OBRA90 
c/     
1991
   [0.150; 0.310]  $2,150 ; $5,000 0.167; 0.173 $1,192; $1,235  0.119; 0.124 $21,250
1992   [0.150; 0.310]  $2,300 ; $5,250 0.176; 0.184 $1,324; $1,384  0.126; 0.131 $22,370
1993   [0.150; 0.396]  $2,350 ; $5,450 0.185; 0.195 $1,434; $1,511  0.132; 0.139 $23,050
OBRA1993 
d/      
1994  [0.150; 0.396]  $2,450 ; $5,600 0.263; 0.300 $2,038; $2,528  0.160; 0.177 $23,755; $25,296
1995   [0.150; 0.396]  $2,500 ; $5,750 0.340; 0.360 $2,094; $3,110  0.160; 0.202 $24,396; $26,673
1996   [0.150; 0.396]  $2,550 ; $5,900 0.340; 0.400 $2,152; $3,556   0.160; 0.211 $25,078; $28,495
1997   [0.150; 0.396]  $2,650 ; $6,050 0.340; 0.400 $2,210; $3,656  0.160; 0.211 $25,750; $29,290
2000  [0.150;0.396]   $2,900; $6,650 0.340; 0.400 $2,353; $3,888  0.160; 0.211 $27,413; $31,152
    
EGTRRA2001
 e/   
2002   [0.100; 0.386]  $3,050 ; $7,000 0.340; 0.400 $2,547; $4,204  0.160; 0.211 $29,201; $33,178
2004   [0.100; 0.35]  $3,100 ; $7,150 0.340; 0.400 $2,604; $4,300  0.160; 0.211 $30,338; $34,458
2005   [0.100; 0.35]  $3,200 ; $7,300 0.340; 0.400 $2,662; $4,400  0.160; 0.211 $31,030; $35,263
a/ The standard deductions are given for head of household tax return. 
b/ In 1984-1986, there were no standard deductions because of the zero bracket. The 15 brackets include the zero bracket. 
c/ Basic EITC only.  Does not include supplemental young child credit or health insurance credit. 
d/ Introduced a small benefit for taxpayers with no qualifying children, phased-in at 0.0765 up to a maximum credit of $306. 
e/ The flat and phase-out regions are expanded by $2000 ($1000) in 2005 (2002-2004) for married couples filing jointly.  
 
Source: U.S. House of Representatives [The Green Book] (various years) and authors' calculations from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) forms and 
publications.   35  
 
          
TABLE II 
STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS, 2004 
 
State  Percentage of Federal Credit (2004) 
Refundable Credits  
Colorado (1999)  10 % (suspended until 2006)
District of Columbia (2000)  25%
Illinois (2000)  5%
Indiana  (1999)  6% (starting in 2003)
Kansas (1998)  15%
Maryland* (1987)  20%
Massachusetts (1997)  15%
Minnesota  (1991)  Varies with earnings; averages 33%
New Jersey (2000)  20% (for families with earnings below $20,000) 
New York (1994)  30%
Oklahoma  (2002)  5%
Vermont (1988)  32%
Wisconsin (1989)  4% (one child);14% (two children);43% (three children)
Non-refundable Credits   
Iowa (1990)  6.5%
Maine** (2000)  4.92%
Oregon (1997)  5%
Rhode Island (1975) 25%
Virginia (2004)  20% (effective 2006) 
 
*Maryland also offers a non-refundable EITC set at 50 percent of the credit.  Taxpayers in effect may claim 
either the refundable credit or the non-refundable credit, but not both. 
**Maine’s non-refundable EITC was reduced from 5% to 4.92% effective in tax years 2003, 2004 and 2005.  
The credit will return to 5% in 2006. 
***Rhode Island made a very small portion of its EITC refundable effective beginning in tax year 2003. 
 
Source: Llobrera and Zahradnik (2004) and www.stateEITC.info (State EITC Online Info Center).   36  
  
Table III 
Percent Distribution of EITC Returns and Claims by Filing Status and  
Number of Qualifying Children, 2001 
 
Number of Qualitfying Children 
  
None  One  
Two or 
More 
             
Percent Distribution of EITC Returns             
Head of Household Filers
1  16%     33%     28%  
Married  Filing  Joint  Filers  2%     7%     14%  
All  filers  18%     40%     42%  
             
Percent Distribution of Total EITC Claims           
Head of Household Filers
1  2%     32%     43%  
Married  Filing  Joint  Filers  0%     6%     17%  
All  filers  2%     37%     61%  
             
Average EITC Claim             
Head of Household Filers
1  $205     $1,615     $2,612  
Married Filing Joint Filers  $205      $1,403       $2,144   
All filers  $205      $1,578       $2,459   
                          
Source: Tabulations from Tax Policy Center, Urban Institute using 2001 Statistics of Income Public Use 
Tax File. 
1/ Includes individuals who file as single. 
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Table IV 
Distribution of EITC Recipients and Claims by EITC Range, 2001 
 
EITC Earnings by EITC Range 
  
Phase-in Flat  Phase-out  All 
 
Percent Distribution of EITC Recipients by EITC Range 
 
Head of Household Filers      
One Child  23%  25%  52%  100% 
Two or More Children  28%  15%  57%  100% 
Married Filing Joint Filers      
One Child  14%  22%  64%  100% 
Two or More Children  15%  10%  75%  100% 
      
 
Percent Distribution of EITC Claims by EITC Range 
 
Head of Household Filers      
One Child  21%  37%  42%  100% 
Two or More Children  27%  23%  50%  100% 
Married Filing Joint Filers      
One Child  14%  37%  49%  100% 
Two or More Children  17%  19%  64%  100% 
 
Notes:  Tabulations from Tax Policy Center, Urban Institute using 2001 Statistics of Income Public 
Use Tax File. 
 
   38  
Table V 
Demographic Characteristics and Tax Rates for Single Mothers, 1985-2000 
 
                       
Year  1985  1989   1992    2000 
 
Demographic Characteristics 
Age  32.04 (7.75)    32.91 (7.77)    32.98 (7.79)    33.44 (8.15) 
Education 
% 12 or more years of 
schooling 
 
0.784 (0.411)     
0.773 (0.418)     
0.793 (0.406)     
0.787 (0.409) 
Black  0.321 (0.467)    0.345 (0.475)    0.338 (0.473)    0.315 (0.464) 
Non-white  0.021 (0.142)    0.023 (0.151)    0.031 (0.172)    0.037 (0.188) 
Number of children  1.94 (1.10)    1.77 (0.99)    1.78 (1.0)    1.74 (0.93) 
Labor force participation  0.707 (0.455)    0.72 (0.447)    0.697 (0.459)    0.830 (0.376) 
Annual hours worked  1142 (961)    1219 (969)    1148 (970)  1426  (903) 
Wage and salary income  $7,922 (9,210)    $10,390  (11,642)   $10,572 (12,740)    $16,430 (19,526) 
Non-labor income  $2,756 (4,605)    $3,277 (5,742)    $3,553 (5,912)    $3,961 (7,740) 
Gross hourly wage  $6.53 (4.43)    $7.85 (5.49)    $8.68 (7.00)    $11.24 (10.68) 
             
 
Tax Rates 
Marginal tax rate  0.259 (0.166)    0.216 (0.175)    0.185 (0.212)    0.231 (0.288) 
Average tax rate  0.145 (0.105)    0.088 (0.089)    0.042 (0.010)    -0.041 (0.180) 
              
Effect of Tax Act  TRA1986   OBRA1990    OBRA1993   EGGTRA2001 
 marginal tax rate  -0.059 (0.095)    -0.017 (0.051)    -0.033 (0.142)    -0.034 (0.071) 
 average tax rate  -0.076 (0.029)    -0.053 (0.016)    -0.128 (0.076)    -0.023 (0.014) 
              
Observations 4,498    4,850    5,011   4,072 
 
 
Source: Eissa, Kleven and Kreiner (2005).  Calculations based on March CPS and include single mothers 
ages 18-49.  Non-labor income is calculated as the difference between total income and earnings, and 
therefore includes income for various sources such as welfare assistance, capital income, social security 
income and workers' compensation. The wage is defined for workers only and is topcoded at $200 in 2000.  
Tax rates are calculated using NBER’s TAXSIM model and include all federal income taxes and the 
payroll tax (assuming individuals bear the entire tax).  Calculations for “effect of tax act” use sample for a 
fixed year and calculates tax rates under old law and new law—the differences are reported.  Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All monetary amounts are in nominal dollars.  
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Table VI 
Average Tax Rates for Hypothetical Single Women with Children (2004 tax law) 
Taxes Calculated with and without the EITC 
 
  Average Tax Rates with the EITC  Average Tax Rates without the EITC 
  Entry to  PT 
work 




Entry to  PT 
work 





A.  Single taxpayer with one child (by hourly wage level) 
 
$5.15/hr  -19% -9%  1%  15% 15%  15% 
$7.50/hr  -18% -3%  12%  15% 12%  12% 
$10/hr  -10% 7%  23%  15%  14%  14% 
$12/hr  -7% 13%  33%  14% 16% 16% 
$15/hr  -3% 19%  41%  12% 19% 19% 
 
B.  Single taxpayer with two or more children (by hourly wage level) 
 
  
$5.15/hr  -25% -25%  -25%  15%  15%  15% 
$7.50/hr  -25% -13%  -2%  15%  12%  12% 
$10/hr  -25% -3%  18%  15% 10%  10% 
$12/hr  -21% 3%  26%  14%  11%  11% 
$15/hr  -13% 12%  38%  12% 14% 14% 
 
Note:  Calculated using TAXSIM.  Numbers represent the average tax rate associated with increasing 
labor supply (either from no work to work or from part time to full time work).  Taxes include all federal 
income taxes plus the payroll tax (assuming individual bears entire 15.3% rate). Part time work is assumed 
to be 20 per week and 52 weeks per year and full time work is assumed to be 40 hours per week, 52 weeks 
per year.   40  
Table VII 
Average Tax Rates for Hypothetical Married Women with Children (2004 tax law) 
Taxes Calculated with and without the EITC 
 
  Average Tax Rates with the EITC  Average Tax Rates without the EITC 
  No work to  
PT work 




No work to 
PT work 





A.  Married women with one child (by hourly wage) 
 
   
$5.15/hr  8%  18%  27% 5% 8%  11% 
$7.50/hr  30% 36% 41% 14% 20% 25% 
$10/hr  41% 35% 30% 25% 27% 29% 
$12/hr  35% 33% 30% 27% 29% 30% 
$15/hr  30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 
 
B.  Married women with two or more children (by hourly wage) 
 
  
$5.15/hr  9%  18%  26% 5% 5% 5% 
$7.50/hr  26% 32% 39%  5% 11% 18% 
$10/hr  36% 36% 36% 14% 21% 28% 
$12/hr  41% 36% 30% 23% 27% 30% 
$15/hr  34% 32% 30% 29% 29% 30% 
 
Note:  Calculated using TAXSIM.  Numbers represent the average tax rate associated with increasing 
labor supply (either from no work to work or from part time to full time work).  For each calculation, the 
husband is assumed to be working full-time and full-year at the same hourly wage as the wife. Taxes 
include all federal income taxes plus the payroll tax (assuming individual bears entire 15.3% rate). Part 
time work is assumed to be 20 per week and 52 weeks per year and full time work is assumed to be 40 
hours per week, 52 weeks per year. 